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or not.
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Community1. Introduction
Collaborative consumption is a new consumption paradigm, which
is gaining popularity due to the economic crisis and increased concern
for protecting the environment (Tussyadiah, 2015). With collaborative
consumption, ownership of a good is replaced by the access to the
good (Belk, 2014; Botsman & Rogers, 2010). Instead of buying goods
and owning them, consumers gain temporary access to goods they
need (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). Collaborative consumption is therefore
a form of consumption where people coordinate the acquisition of a re-
source for a (monetary or non-monetary) compensation (Belk, 2014).
People are provided with access to a good, mostly without the higher
costs and responsibilities usually accompanied by ownership. Collabo-
rative consumption covers a range of transactions in almost all business
areas, including entertainment (e.g., ﬁle sharing), food (e.g., communal
gardens), and trafﬁc (e.g., car sharing). For instance, the term “commu-
nal garden” covers several models of garden organization, like neigh-
borhood gardens, in which people informally or formally farm on land
in their neighborhood (Alaimo, Packnett, Miles, & Kruger, 2008). Simi-
larly, consumers can share goods in public book boxes or open-G16 from the Austrian Science
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. This is an open access article underworkshops, where people access tools for work around their house.
See Table A
Various terms are used in the literature referring to collaborative
consumption or similar concepts, such as “sharing economy”
(Heinrichs, 2013) which is often used synonymously for “collaborative
consumption,” “sharing,” “access-based consumption,” or “anti-con-
sumption.” Engaging in collaborative consumption actions is, contrary
to sharing, not necessarily altruistic, but is rather underlined by eco-
nomic exchange (Bardhi& Eckhardt, 2012). The concept of collaborative
consumption is also related to “access-based consumption” (Bardhi &
Eckhardt, 2012), which contains elements of both collaborative con-
sumption and sharing (Belk, 2014), and anti-consumption (Albinsson
& Perera, 2012), as the sharing of resources, for instance, in toy lending
libraries (Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010; Ozanne & Ozanne, 2011), reduces
the consumption of new goods (c.f. “reduced levels of consumption,”
Shaw & Newholm, 2002).
Engaging in collaborative consumption is increasing in popularity
(Belk, 2014), stimulating new business models. One million car sharing
members in North America in the beginning of 2013 (Birdsall, 2014)
and many millions of room nights sold by Aribnb (Guttentag, 2013)
show that collaborative consumption is on the rise. Although collabora-
tive consumption is a competitive business model and thereby chal-
lenging conventional providers (Möhlmann, 2015), little is known
about possible demands providers of collaborative consumption face.
New business models based on the concept of collaborative con-
sumption comprise new challenges for the market place. In contrast to
conventional businesses, collaborative consumption businesses arethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table A
Absolute and relative frequencies of the categories used in the correspondence analysis.
Cooperative members Non-cooperative members
Supporters Non-supporters Supporters Non-supporters
Increased return rate n 27 1 12 0
f 20.0 2.3 11.8 0
People need regulation n 15 0 30 1
f 11.1 0 29.4 1.6
Distrust n 2 5 3 4
f 1.5 11.4 2.9 6.6
Alternative incentives n 4 8 4 3
f 3.0 18.2 3.9 4.9
Self-determination n 7 5 1 9
f 5.2 11.4 1.0 14.8
Freedom n 3 1 0 5
f 2.2 2.3 0 8.2
People are egoistic n 41 0 30 2
f 30.4 0 29.4 3.3
Flexibility n 5 3 0 0
f 3.7 6.8 0 0
Negative consequences n 4 7 6 9
f 3.0 15.9 5.9 14.8
Contradicts the concept n 0 1 0 5
f 0 2.3 0 8.2
No behavioral change n 0 3 0 6
f 0 6.8 0 9.8
Enough control mechanisms n 0 5 0 2
f 0 6.8 0 3.3
Morality n 2 1 8 5
f 1.5 2.3 7.8 8.2
Concentration of power n 2 1 0 3
f 1.5 2.3 0 4.9
Breaks community
n 0 2 1 3
f 0 4.5 1.0 4.9
Offense
n 19 2 6 0
f 14.1 4.5 5.9 0
Other
n 4 1 1 4
f 3.0 2.3 1.0 6.6
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(Cusumano, 2015) and of lacking safeguards for customers (Rauch &
Schleicher, 2015). Regulation has become a highly charged policy
topic, leading to the questionwhether it protects consumers or restrains
companies from entering collaborative consumption (Koopman,
Mitchell, & Thierer, 2014; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015). In order to answer
whether and how collaborative consumption should be regulated, it
needs to be considered that the concept of collaborative consumption
comprises various business models, differing in several features.
Collaborative consumption can be organized by companies
(business-to-consumer; Shaheen & Cohen, 2007), other consumers
(Ballus-Armet, Shaheen, Clonts, & Weinzimmer, 2014), or communities
(Jenny, Fuentes, & Mosler, 2007). Most of the research has been devoted
to business-to-consumer models. For instance, Bardhi and Eckhardt
(2012) conducted interviews with customers from a car sharing compa-
ny, showing additionally that regulation and governance are evaluated
positively by consumers, maybe due to a lack of trust in the other
users. As car sharing users themselves act opportunistically (e.g., not giv-
ing aGPS receiver left in the car to the lost and found), they expect others
to do the same (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). When it comes to a business-
to-consumer model, the company can take the responsibility of manag-
ing distrust between community members via a governance system.
However, the term “collaborative consumption” covers also con-
sumption from self-regulating communities, like communal gardens
(Birky & Strom, 2013) or toy libraries (Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010). Re-
search on communal gardens (e.g., Armstrong, 2000; Ferris, Norman,
& Sempik, 2001; Glover, 2004; Saldivar-Tanaka & Krasny, 2004) has fo-
cused on vegetable production (Algert, Baameur, & Renvall, 2014), food
diversity (Guitart, Pickering, & Byrne, 2014), or potential conﬂicts be-
tween different actors in a communal garden (Schmelzkopf, 2002). Peo-
ple share resources by cultivating a garden, which may be public orowned by a community, and harvest the fruits. Bardhi and Eckhardt
(2012) suggest that it may be a more social type of collaborative con-
sumption as consumers seem to feel responsible for the community
and its members. As a result, trust between the community members
plays a signiﬁcant role. If people lack trust in other users in such a situ-
ation, they may call for governance and regulation, like customers of a
car sharing company (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). Especially the hetero-
geneity of member's interests and goals can result in management
problems (e.g., in the context of online communites of consumption,
see Sibai, de Valck, Farrell, & Rudd, 2015). Hamari, Sjöklint, and
Ukkonen (2015) mention, that in a worst-case scenario, some con-
sumers might altruistically share their goods whereas others may free
ride and be mostly enjoying beneﬁts from the sharing. Due to possible
problems emerging from collaborative consumption businesses, a polit-
ical debate started of whether to adapt existing regulations in order to
cover collaborative consumption businesses (e.g., for New York, see
Bellafante, 2015, July 24; for Brazil, see The Guardian, 2015, September
3; for Austria, see Der Standard, 2015, August 13). As more and more
networks are created to share resources, the question arises of whether
to regulate and control access or not and whether consumers would
support its regimentation.
In order to prevent negative consequences of governance systems, it
is necessary to gain knowledge of consumers' attitudes toward control
and sanctions in collaborative consumption. Nevertheless, there is a
lack of research on the problem of cooperation in collaborative con-
sumption and studies onmechanisms solving this problem are urgently
needed (Hamari et al., 2015). The current study addresses this research
gap by exploring the challenge of governance in a collaborative con-
sumption community based on the ﬁndings of Bardhi and Eckhardt
(2012) on car sharing companies. It is investigated how consumers
react toward governance and control in a situation where a community
2758 B. Hartl et al. / Journal of Business Research 69 (2016) 2756–2763organizes collaborative consumption. The current study extends
existing research in several ways: First, it is examined within a collabo-
rative consumption community whether governance increases cooper-
ation. Second, it is investigated if and why consumers support a
governance system in the context of collaborative consumption com-
munity or oppose it. Third, it is examined whether supporters and
non-supporters of this governance system differ in their distrust in
other group members. To address these questions, an experiment,
using a within-subject design, was conducted.
2. Theoretical background
The situation in an open workshop, and in any other collaborative
consumption situation, represents a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980). So-
cial dilemmas are situations inwhich the personal interest of an individ-
ual is opposed to the interest of the community (Dawes, 1980).
Members of a community face the choice of either to cooperate, which
would be costly for them, or to defect for self-interest. If most people
try to maximize their own utility and act selﬁshly, the outcome can be-
come a disaster for the whole community (“tragedy of the commons,”
Hardin, 1968).
The theory of social dilemmahas been adapted to consumer research,
for instance, in order to investigate consumers' proenvironmental behav-
ior (Khachatryan, Joireman, & Casavant, 2013; Pieters, Bijmolt, van Raaij,
& de Kruijk, 1998), e.g., their decisions to buy (gain for the community)
or not to buy (self-interest) green, and thereby very often more expen-
sive products (Gupta &Ogden, 2009). Further, the decision of consumers
whether to pay a higher price and thus rewarding a company for their
corporate social responsibility or to maximize their individual gain by
not paying a price premium(Gupta, 2015) has been framed as a social di-
lemma, as well as energy use (Samuelson, 1990) or consumer boycotts
(Sen, Gurhan-Canli, &Morwitz, 2001). In case of collaborative consump-
tion, whereby people use resources obtained by a community, for in-
stance tools, books, or fruits grown in the garden, a social dilemma
occurs as consumers are individually better off when they make use of
shared resourceswithout contributing in return. They can beneﬁt by act-
ing selﬁshly and in this vein, “each farmer does best by taking as much
irrigation water as possible, and each ﬁsher beneﬁts from catching as
many ﬁsh as possible” (Kollock, 1998, p. 184). A way to encourage coop-
eration is tomonitor and sanction defection (Kollock, 1998). Governance
systems sanctioning non-cooperation are usually implemented by au-
thorities, as for instance national governments, when it comes to hinder
music piracy (Coyle, Gould, Gupta, & Gupta, 2009; Yang, Wang, &
Mourali, 2015), or companies, when it comes to consumption (Bardhi
& Eckhardt, 2012).
Interviews show that customers of a car sharing company wel-
come monitoring control mechanism because they think of it as an
opportunity to induce equitable usage among the users (Bardhi &
Eckhardt, 2012). However, when a group of people regulates collab-
orative consumption, no clear monitoring authority exists. There are
often less explicit rules or legal regulations than in a business-to-
consumer model. It is therefore of interest whether consumers
support a governance system when collaborative consumption is or-
ganized by a community and whether the introduction of a gover-
nance system increases cooperation of supporters as well as non-
supporters. Based on the literature on social dilemmas, we assume
that the introduction of a governance system positively affects
cooperation.
RQ1. : Do consumers support the introduction of a governance system in
collaborative consumption communities?
H1. : The introduction of a governance system increases cooperation.
Although sanctions are discussed as a possible solution to ensure co-
operation, research on social dilemmas has also shown the disadvan-
tages of sanctions as they can undermine cooperation when trust inother group members was initially high (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer,
& Wilke, 2006). In this vein, people are willing to contribute to a sanc-
tion system if they share the goal of cooperation but do not trust other
group members to voluntarily cooperate (Yamagishi, 1986). The intro-
duction of a sanction system can make people further aware that
other group members act in their own self-interest and exploit the re-
sources of the community (Mulder et al., 2006) and as a result under-
mines trust (Fu, Lin, & Sun, 2013). Social dilemma research therefore
suggests that trust in other community members is particularly impor-
tant for understanding attitudes toward sanctions and governance in a
community.
Trust plays an important role in consumer behavior, as economic
transactions involve risk and trust in another party is making oneself
vulnerable toward the actions of the other party (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995). Several studies in marketing have examined the
role of trust in the buyer–seller relationship (e.g., Ganesan & Hess,
1997), in peer-to-peer electronic communities (Li & Ling, 2004), system
trust in business-to-consumer transactions (Pennington, Wilcox, &
Grover, 2003), or contracts as a way to harm or foster trust in business
relationships (Praxmarer-Carus, 2014). First results in collaborative
consumption show that in both business-to-consumer and consumer-
to-consumer models, trust is essential for consumers' satisfaction
(Möhlmann, 2015). In a business-to-consumer model, consumers
have to rely on the promises given by companies, but risk for both
parties can be reduced by contracts and legal regulation. In the context
of collaborative consumption organized by a community, trust in others'
willingness to cooperatemay be evenmore important (Belk, 2014), as a
lack of legal requirements results inmore uncertainty for the consumer.
If people lack trust in other users in such a situation, they may call for
governance and regulation in order to handle risk in an economic ex-
change. Thus, we assume that in the setting of collaborative consump-
tion, people, who trust others to cooperate, do not support the
introduction of a governance system, whereas people who distrust
others favor control mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize the
following:
H2. Supporters of a governance system have more distrust in other people
than non-supporters.
In order for companies to address the needs of consumers in collab-
orative consumption business models, it is relevant to know why con-
sumers support or oppose a governance system and whether
cooperative or non-cooperative members differ concerning their con-
siderations. A regulation systemmay be perceived as necessary, as com-
munity members might otherwise take advantage of others. People,
who already act honestly, may claim the implementation of a gover-
nance system as a safeguard against non-cooperators (cf. research on
tax compliance, Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015). Further, consumers
might think that the system will break down without enforcement
mechanisms and therefore see governance as necessary device
(Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). Additionally, the existence of control mech-
anisms may remind consumers of the well-being of the larger group
rather than just their own interest. However, control mechanisms can
be perceived as a limitation of choice autonomy and freedom (Falk &
Kosfeld, 2006). The implementation of a government system can there-
fore have several negative outcomes, such as negative emotions (Jofﬁly,
Masclet, Noussair, & Villeval, 2014), and reactance (Kirchler, 2007). Be-
sides investigating the consequences of governance, the current article
also addresses considerationswhypeople do or donot support the imple-
mentation of a governance system and whether the reasons of coopera-
tive community members differ from non-cooperative members. As the
literature provides different explanations why people support or oppose
sanctions and governance, research question 2 is stated as follows:
RQ2. Why do consumers support or oppose the introduction of a
governance system in collaborative consumption communities? Do the
reasons differ for cooperative and non-cooperative consumers?
Fig. 1.Means and standard errors of cooperation for supporters and non-supporters for
the ﬁrst (“no governance”) and for the second (“governance”) vignette.
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3.1. Participants
A convenience sample was drawn from Austria and Germany, coun-
tries in which collaborative consumption is gaining in popularity
(e.g., the number of accommodations offered on Airbnb rose in Austria
within 1 year by 140%, Putschloegl & Zoidl, 2015, March 28) and in
which consumers receive information on collaborative consumption
from public authorities (e.g., the Austrian chamber of labor,
Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich, 2014) or via the media (e.g., Hamann,
2014, September 17; Hank & von Petersdorff, 2013, April 13). The link
to an online questionnaire was sent out by university members to
their acquaintances. In the end, the questionnaire was completed
by 355 consumers (35.8% men, Mage = 26.61 years, SDage = 8.41,
Rangeage = 18–60).Whereby themajority of participants (63.7%) re-
ported earnings less than 1000 euro per month, and about a third of
the participants had a university degree (28.5%); 59.4% had a high
school degree, 4.5% a degree from a vocational school, 5.1% a vocational
training certiﬁcate, 0.6% a degree from compulsory school, and 2.0% had
other degrees.
3.2. Materials and procedure
Using awithin-subject design, participantswere ﬁrst introduced to a
collaborative consumption situation (open workshop) without audits
and sanctions (“no governance”) in the online questionnaire. Partici-
pants imagined living in a city in which a workshop with a tool library
at free disposal exists for all citizens. This open workshop should enable
citizens to lend tools for work around their house or ﬂat at no costs. All
tools should be returned after 3 days. The access to the open workshop
and the use of the tools is not subject to any controls. In a second vi-
gnette (“governance”), participants were informed that due to a reorga-
nization of the open workshop, a governance system had been
established to better monitor the access to the workshop. Further, the
community now punishes inappropriate use or delayed return of the
tools. After each of the two vignettes, participants had to indicate how
likely they would cooperate and return the tools within 3 days (“How
likely would you keep the tools longer than three days?”; 7-point Likert
scale; item was recoded).
After the second vignette, participants had to indicate whether they
support the implementation of a governance system or not (“The imple-
mentation of a governance system is a good idea/is a bad idea”). Based on
the question concerning their support, participants were assigned to
two groups: supporters versus non-supporters. Further, participants
had to state reasons for their evaluation (“The implementation of a gover-
nance system is a good idea/a bad idea, because…”; open question). Next,
levels of distrust in other people's cooperation are assessed using ﬁve
items adapted from van Lange, van Vugt, Meertens, and Ruiter (1998).
For each item(e.g., If a community shares resources, you have to be careful,
otherwise people will exploit you), participants indicated the level of
agreement, 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Cronbach alpha for
the distrust scale was .76.
4. Results
For answering research question 1, whether governance is support-
ed in collaborative consumption, the analysis revealed that themajority
of the participants, 81.7%, supported the introduction of a governance
system (290 supporters; 65 non-supporters). To test whether the im-
plementation of a governance system increases cooperation andwheth-
er the effect differs for supporters and non-supporters (Hypothesis 1), a
repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted including support of the
sanction system (supporters versus non-supporters) as independent
variable. The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of condition
(no governance system vs. governance system), F(1, 351) = 137.75,p b .001, η2p = .28. As expected, cooperation increased when control
mechanism and sanctions were possible (Mno governance = 3.69, SD =
2.06; Mgovernance = 5.65, SD = 1.64; Fig. 1). Further, analysis revealed
no signiﬁcant main effect of support of the sanction system on cooper-
ation, F(1, 351) = 0.41, p= .84, but a tendency for an interaction effect
between the condition and support, F(1, 351)=3.51, p=.06,η2p= .01.
Supporters and non-supporters do not generally differ in their level of
cooperation, but the tendency for the interaction effect indicates that
non-supporters act more cooperative than supporters if no governance
system exists and less cooperative if governance was introduced
(Fig. 1).
Whether people support or oppose the introduction of a governance
system may be related to their (dis-)trust in other people (Hypothesis
2). To test Hypothesis 2, an ANOVA was conducted. As expected, the
analysis revealed that supporters' (M = 4.67, SD = 1.12) distrust in
other people is stronger than non-supporters' (M = 3.53, SD = 1.21;
F(1, 353) = 53.27, p b .001, η2p = .13). This suggests that people are
in need for governance in case of collaborative consumption, when
they do not trust the other community members.
4.1. Reasons for governance systems
To examinewhy people support or oppose the introduction of a gov-
ernance system, answers to the open question (“The implementation of a
governance system is a good idea/a bad idea, because…) were analyzed.
Participants indicated 616 reasons for their (non-)support. Participants
who supported the governance system stated on average 1.98 reasons;
non-supporters stated on average 1.67 reasons. For further analyses,
two independent raters (1 female, 1 male) were instructed to assign
all reasons to 38 categories of a predeﬁned categorization scheme (see
Appendix). An interrater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic
was performed to determine consistency among raters (Kappa =
0.81; p b .001), which indicated a strong agreement (Landis & Koch,
1977). In case of disagreement, the raters afterwards discussed each
statement until an agreement was reached.
Results show that supporters of a government system most fre-
quently reported that humans are egoistic (15%), humans need regula-
tion (9.4%), and that a governance system leads to an increased return
rate (8%). On the other hand, non-supporters most frequently stated
concerns about negative consequences of governance (13.2%) and con-
cerns about losing self-determination (10.9%) and stress the need of al-
ternative incentives (8.5%).
To answer research question 2, whether the reasons of cooperative
community members for supporting the sanction system differ from
uncooperative members, a correspondence analysis was applied,
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non-support) and whether participants had indicated to bring back
the tool in time in the ﬁrst vignette when sanctions were not a possibil-
ity in the tool library (cooperative vs. uncooperative behavior, median
split). The correspondence analysis is a method that yields a graphical
representation of the associations between columns and rows of a con-
tingency table. A correspondence analysis depicts the similarity of as-
signment proﬁles; therefore, concepts that are related to one another
are closely related in the ﬁgure. The frequencies of all categories (see
Table A), separated by support of the governance system (support vs.
non-support) and cooperative behavior (cooperative vs. uncooperative)
were analyzed by means of a correspondence analysis (Blasius, 2001).
Applying the correspondence analysis to all 38 categories resulted in a
two-dimensional conﬁguration. A cross table of the standardized resid-
uals shows that the amount of the standardized residuals of 17 catego-
ries was greater than 1.96. Those 17 categories were included in the
ﬁnal correspondence analysis (see Appendix for table of frequencies),
which resulted in a two-dimensional conﬁguration explaining 88% of
the variance (Fig. 2).
The ﬁrst dimension (explaining 71% of the variance) pointed at dif-
ferent views of motivation for cooperative behavior. Conﬁgured along
the negative hemisphere of the ﬁrst dimension were categories such
as “humans are egoistic,” “humans need regulation,” as well as “in-
creased return rate,” indicating that people need extrinsic incentives
to be cooperative. In contrast, the categories “enough control mecha-
nisms” and “contradicts the concept”were found on the positive hemi-
sphere of the ﬁrst dimension.
Categories such as “morality” and “ﬂexibility” are describing the dif-
ferent poles of the second dimension (explaining 17% of the variance),
indicating that the second dimension differentiates between ﬁxed
moral rules and ﬂexible arrangements. Cooperative supporters are lo-
cated in the positive hemisphere of the seconddimension, characterized
by security concerns, such as “increase return rate” and “humans are
egoistic.” Uncooperative supporters, in the negative hemisphere of the
second dimension, are located near the category “humans need regula-
tion,” which indicates that people need to be motivated by audits and
sanctions in order to be cooperative. On the one hand, people who do
not support the government systemand already react cooperativewith-
out governance are located near the categories “alternative incentives”
and “enough control mechanism.” On the other hand, uncooperative
people who do not support the governance system are closely relatedFig. 2. Graphical portrayal of correspondence analysis results.to the concepts “breaks community,” “no behavioral change,“ and “neg-
ative consequences.”
5. Discussion
Due to the growing popularity of collaborative consumption, it is rel-
evant to understandwhat kind of challenges collaborative consumption
provides for the market. Extant literature suggests that collaborative
consumption lacks regulation in contrast to conventional businesses
(Koopman et al., 2014; Rauch & Schleicher, 2015). The aim of the cur-
rent study is to contribute to research on collaborative consumption
as well as to the political debate about collaborative consumption
businesses by examining the role of governance in a community of con-
sumers. Thereby,we extend previous research on car sharing customers
(Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012) by showing that consumers do not only wel-
come governance when a company takes the responsibility of regula-
tion but also when a community of consumers governs itself.
In the current study, a great majority of consumers support the
introduction of a governance system in an open workshop. Analyz-
ing the reasons for or against governance systems, the current
study shows that consumers support governance because they
think of humans as egoistic and in need of regulation. Supporters of
a governance system underline that governance is in their opinion
needed in order to increase the return rate of commonly used
goods in collaborative consumption. This ﬁnding indicates that ama-
jority of people would engage in collaborative consumption, if the
access and use of the goods are controlled. Nevertheless, non-
supporters of a governance system are most concerned about nega-
tive consequences of governance systems. Consumers fear a loss of
self-determination and a break in the relationship of the community
members, resulting in less cooperation.
In the current study, governance positively impacts cooperation,
which is in line with earlier research that stresses the effectiveness
of control and sanctions in a social dilemma (Milinski &
Rockenbach, 2012; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). The current analy-
sis shows a tendency for an interaction effect, indicating that the im-
plementation of a governance system may decrease cooperation
when people do not support it. Though the effect size of the interac-
tion effect is rather small, it is relevant for further research to take
negative consequences of sanctions on collaborative consumption
in consideration and examine possible double-edged effects. As the
implementation of a sanction system prompts people to think of a
decision in business terms rather than in ethical terms, it may have
negative consequences on cooperation (Tenbrunsel & Messick,
1999). Beneﬁts of a governance system may therefore only emerge
when cooperation would be highly unlikely without sanctions
(Jiang, Perc, & Szolnoki, 2013).
The current study also contributes to social dilemma research by in-
vestigating a social dilemma situations where no authority exists. Com-
munities worldwide face the question of how to ensure that local
resources, such as water, food, and land, are used sustainably (van
Vugt, 2002). In order to guarantee that the member acts according to
the interest of the community, regulation is an important topic. The
present results suggest that in a social dilemma situationwithout an au-
thority, community members welcome governance mechanisms and
that the implementation of a governance system successfully increases
cooperation. This is in line with laboratory experiments showing that
participants often voluntarily implement sanctioning institutions
(Kosfeld, Okada, & Riedl, 2009).
Although the current study sheds light on regulation as a challenge
for themarket in collaborative consumption, there are some limitations,
which have to be considered in further research. In the study, the deci-
sions to cooperate or not were solely based on the description of the
openworkshop. This is in contrast to a real-world situation of collabora-
tive consumptionwhich is often characterized as a social and less anon-
ymous situation (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). It is highly likely that people
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the group, as for example in a communal garden in the neighborhood. If
community members know each other well and share partnering expe-
riences, which is more likely in small groups, greater mutual trust en-
hances cooperation (Sánchez de Pablo González del Campo, Peña
García Pardo, & Hernández Perlines, 2014; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986),
making control mechanisms less necessary. The need of regulation is
meant to be a problem for large groups, where it is nearly impossible
to affect others' outcomes. Nevertheless, due to its increasing popularity
and digitalization, collaborative consumption is not a small group phe-
nomenon of close acquaintance anymore. As group sizes increase, com-
munication and coordination of action gets harder. Such large-scale
dilemmas can be solved by rewarding cooperators or punishing defec-
tors (Kollock, 1998).
The current study is one of the ﬁrst to investigate collaborative con-
sumption regulated by a community, demonstrating that consumers'
request for governance is a relevant outcome for the market. Although
a great majority of people supports the implementation of sanctions in
the current study, the need of both groups, supporters as well as non-
supporters of a governance system, has to be considered in designing
successful collaborative consumption business models. Negative conse-
quences of governance may be prevented by addressing the need of
consumers via a differentiated approach whereby the community rec-
ognizes those group members worthy of prosecution and those deserv-
ing of encouragement and support (Braithwaite, 2001). In order to
satisfy both groups, supporters as well as non-supporters of a gover-
nance system, the way of how audits and sanctions are exercised may
be a key determinant of whether a sanction system will be accepted
by the community. If a sanction system is perceived as fair, cooperation
increases (Verboon & van Dijke, 2011), whereas sanctions can destroy
altruistic cooperation almost completely when they are not applied in
a fair way (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). It is therefore relevant that mon-
itoring and sanctions are based on acceptance of the community mem-
bers. Besides the execution of sanctions, future research should
investigate alternative forms of governance, such as social control to as-
sure members' continued engagement (Sibai et al., 2015).
The ﬁndings are particularly important as in the context of collab-
orative consumptionmore andmore networks are created via the In-
ternet to share resources. Such big networks face the question of
whether to regulate and control access or not, especially when com-
munity members differ according to their motives for engaging in
collaborative consumption. If the motives of the consumers do not
comply with the conditions of a collaborative consumption setting,
consumers may decide to opt out and buy goods rather than tempo-
rarily own them. Current results indicate that a majority of people
would engage in collaborative consumption, if the access and use of
the goods are controlled. This may be particularly the case if con-
sumers choose collaborative consumption for economic reasons. If
people's decision to engage in collaborative consumption is based
on social considerations, the implementation of a governance system
may lead to reactance and less cooperative behavior or consumers
will opt out. Further research should therefore concentrate on the
motives for engaging in collaborative consumption as some con-
sumers may consider it as a form of boycott (Neilson, 2010) or try
to reject consumption in order to live a sustainable life (Black &
Cherrier, 2010; McDonald, Oates, Young, & Hwang, 2006) rather
than because of economic considerations (Belk, 2014).
Appendix A. Descriptive categories in the English and German
languages.English German original Example31 Motivation to
cooperateMotivation zur
Kooperation“fostering people's discipline”continued)English German original Example2 Increased return
rateRückgabequote
erhöhen“ensuring the returning of the
tool within the deadline”3 Pressure Druck “some people do not feel
pressure without control
mechanisms”4 Peacefully living
togetherFriedliches
Zusammenleben“people can hardly live
peacefully together without
sanctions”5 People need
regulationMenschen brauchen
Regeln“I think that people need
certain rules, etc. in order to be
functional”6 Incentive for
non-cooperationAnreiz zur
Nichtkooperation“the incentive for deviating
behavior is otherwise too high”7 Distrust Misstrauen “communicates mistrust”
8 Alternative
incentives
Alternative Anreize “rather rewarding positive
behavior than punishing
negative behavior”9 Self-determination Selbstbestimmung “I think that self-monitoring
works”0 Based on
acceptanceBasierend auf
Akzeptanz“consequences should […] be
based on consensus”1 Freedom Freiheit “restriction of freedom”
2 People are honest Menschen sind ehrlich “most people are honest”
3 Preservation of
system
Erhalt des Systems “otherwise the system fails”4 People are egoistic Menschen sind
egoistisch“otherwise people are only
concerned about their own
beneﬁts’5 Conditionally Situationsabhängigkeit “furthermore individual
situations are not taken into
consideration”6 Flexibility Flexibilität “the period of renting needs to
be more ﬂexible”7 Negative
consequencesNegative
Konsequenzen“it dulls people”8 Fairness Gerechtigkeit “fair distribution of resources;
ensure justice”9 Large group issue Problem großer
Gruppen“without it, it cannot work with
an unlimited number of users”0 Contradicts the
conceptWiderspricht der Idee “the idea of an open workshop
is lost”1 Security Sicherheit “conveys safety”
2 Generates
commitment
Schafft Verbindlichkeit “they help to make rules more
binding”
3 Acceptance of
controls
Zustimmung zu
Kontrollen“in principle, nothing can be
said against audits”4 Final consequence Als letzte Konsequenz “in the worst case, sanctions are
needed”5 No behavioral
changeKeine
Verhaltensänderung“people who want to break the
rules either do not expect to get
caught anyway or ﬁnd ways
and means to obscure their
activities”6 Enough control
mechanismsKontrollen
ausreichend“there are enough penalties”7 Morality Moral/Werte “some people have no decency”
8 Orientation Lernen/Orientierung “people learn from
sanctions/rewards
(wrong/right)”9 Anarchy Chaos/Anarchie “maintain order; otherwise it
gets out of hands and becomes
anarchy”0 Concentration of
powerMachtkonzentration “totalitarianism”1 Law Rechte/Gesetze “rules and laws are important”
2 Self-inﬂicted Selbst verschuldet “because they did not return
the tool, the sanctions are the
citizens’ own fault”3 Rules are known Regeln Sind bekannt “everyone knows when a
particular tool has to be
returned”4 Rules require
controlRegeln benötigen
Kontrolle“because rules only make sense,
if there are control
mechanisms”5 Breaks community Zerstört Gemeinschaft “it destroys the faith in the(continued on next page)
(A
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3English German original Example
community”
6 For the good of all ZumWohle der
Gemeinschaft
“enhancing public welfare”7 Offense Straftaten “preventing theft”
8 Other Restkategorie “you never know”3A.1. Vignettes used in the study
Vignette 1: “No governance system”
Imagine living in a city, where an open workshop exists with tools
for free use for all citizens. This open workshop should enable all citi-
zens to borrow tools for repairs around the house or ﬂat for free. After
appropriate use, all tools should be returned after three days. The access
to the open workshop and the use of the tools is not subject to any
controls.
You borrowed some of the tools for repairing something at your
house, but you weren't able to ﬁnish the work within 3 days and
would need the tools two days longer.
Vignette 2: “Governance system”
Due to a reorganization of the open workshop, the community
agrees to introduce regular checks, in order to govern the access to the
openworkshop and to govern the use of the tools. Further, the commu-
nity now has the opportunity to punish inappropriate use and delayed
return severely.
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